`withdrawal.order.locked`

Member-initiated on-chain withdrawal submitted; funds removed from the available balance

When Emitted

Emitted when the member submits the withdrawal in the App. The funds have already left the available balance and entered a separate withdrawal-in-transit bucket, but payout has not occurred. Treat this as a balance-reduction notification, not confirmation that funds reached the destination address. The final result arrives in withdrawal.order.completed / .failed. This is unrelated to the two-phase debiting flow of POST /v1/withdrawals; see the introduction above.

This event is not initiated by an API call

Member-initiated on-chain withdrawal from the App; merchant endpoints cannot initiate it. ⚠ This flow is disabled under merchant_hosted, so you will probably never receive this event.

Payload

{
  "event_id": "evt_5e81c0a7f39b4d26ae4713b8c0d5f9a2",
  "event_type": "withdrawal.order.locked",
  "created_at": "2026-08-12T13:05:22Z",
  "merchant_id": "acme",
  "livemode": true,
  "data": {
    "object": "withdrawal",
    "id": "8f2a41d6-0c7b-4e39-9a15-63d0c8be7f24",
    "external_member_id": "u_88123",
    "status": "locked",
    "status_version": 1
  }
}

Payload Fields

Field	Type	Description
`id`	string	Use this for deduplication. `evt_…` remains unchanged when the same event is redelivered.
`type`	string	Always `withdrawal.order.locked`
`created_at`	string	Time the event was created (RFC3339), not its delivery time. It is unchanged on redelivery.
`data.object`	string	Object type; determines which endpoint to query with `data.id`
`data.id`	string	Object ID; use it to retrieve details.
`data.status`	string	Treat unrecognized values as unknown and raise an alert; do not fall back to “processing”
`data.status_version`	number	Monotonically increasing; use it to discard older states that arrive late.

Signature Verification and Deduplication

Verify the signature against the raw request body bytes. Do not parse and reserialize the JSON: your JSON library may change key order or whitespace, which changes the signature and can look like a key configuration error.

// Node · Run before parsing JSON
const raw = await readRawBody(req);            // Buffer / string; do not use parsed req.body
const expect = crypto.createHmac("sha256", WEBHOOK_SECRET).update(raw).digest("hex");
const got = req.headers["z-signature"];        // Format: t=<unix>,v1=<hex>
if (!timingSafeEqual(expect, parseV1(got))) return res.status(400).end();

// Deduplicate using the envelope id, not data.id
if (await seen(JSON.parse(raw).id)) return res.status(200).end();

For the full procedure, including timestamp tolerance and redelivery semantics, see Webhook Guide.